The author examines the challenges and opportunities of nuclear power in meeting the projected large absolute increase in energy demand, especially electricity, throughout the industrialized and developing world, while helping to mitigate the threat of climate change. A significant global nuclear power deployment would engender serious risks related to proliferation, safety, and waste disposal. Unlike renewable sources of energy, nuclear power is an unforgiving technology because human lapses and errors can have ecological and social impacts that are catastrophic and irreversible. However, according to some analysts, advances in the design of nuclear reactors may have reduced their associated risks and improved their performance. Moreover, while a variety of renewable energy sources (hydro, wind, modern biomass, solar) will play important roles in the transition to a low-carbon economy, some analysts perceive that nuclear power is the only proven technology for generating electricity that is both largely carbon-free, not location specific (as with wind, hydro and solar), and amenable to significant scaling up. Thus given the projections of threats from climate change, and if the considerable strain experienced by world energy markets in recent years is a harbinger of things to come, then there is a rationale for examining the pros and cons of nuclear power as a supply option within low-carbon strategies. It should be noted that despite the emerging centrality of climate change and security of supply in the energy policy debate, nuclear power is still viewed with a great deal of skepticism and in fact continues to elicit considerable opposition. Indeed the views on nuclear power in the context of sustainable energy policy are highly divergent. A thorough evaluation of all aspects of the issue is warranted. JEL codes: L52, L54, L94, L97, L98
world will need by 2030? Since the bulk of that additional capacity will be required in the developing world, whether and how this challenge is to be met is a dilemma of unprecedented complexity and magnitude for sustainable development.
A number of energy sources and technological options exist-though with major environmental, social, and economic tradeoffs. Immediate reductions in GHG emissions can be achieved through lowering demand by increasing the efficiency with which electricity is used and by expanding the deployment of existing renewable generation technologies. However, it is argued that these benign measures will not be enough to make ends meet (Pacala and Socolow 2004; Frois 2005) . Even restraining the increase in per capita energy consumption in the face of growing energy demand in developing countries will require very substantial improvements in energy efficiency. Hydropower is cost effective in a number of locations, but utilization of potential new sites is likely to be limited given that these sites are often less accessible and precious for environmental and social reasons. A major expansion of biomass fuels would require vast land areas for cultivation, in competition with increasing food production and the preservation of natural ecosystems. And the cost characteristics of solar photovoltaics (PV) are still highly unfavorable (EC 2007) , except in off-grid locations where the costs of alternatives are even higher. Although there is considerable interest in concentrating solar power (CSP), it is only commercially semi-mature and involves costs and location constraints on the delivery from source to demand.
The most promising renewable technology for the near to medium term is seen by many to be wind power, which is already near commercial viability and is achieving high penetration rates in some countries (for example, Denmark, Germany, and Spain).
2 When combined with hydro storage-and where a wide area grid can even out local fluctuations in wind strength, as in the United Kingdom and Europe-problems of intermittency can be handled up to appreciable shares in total generation. While many developing countries have a substantial wind resource-Central America, Chile, Brazil, Pakistan, Mexico, Mongoliain others wind resources are less satisfactory and would require substantial complementary investments in transmission and reserve capacity. Fossil fuels can be decarbonized, but the underlying technology is in the early stages of development and is clouded by large uncertainties regarding the speed of implementation and the ultimate feasibility of large-scale application of carbon capture and storage (CCS). That should change in the near future as commercial scale pilot installations are under consideration in a number of countries, and experience of social acceptability of on-shore transmission of the carbon dioxide is gathered. More to the point, CCS is doubly capital intensive, both in terms of the extra equipment to handle the carbon dioxide and the lowered efficiency of the overall plant. Current cost projections suggest CCS would require a carbon dioxide price of U.S. $50/ton to be commercial in the United States (and higher where coal costs and quality are lower, as in South Africa, China, and India), making it costlier than some other low-carbon options (MIT 2007) . That said, provided that CCS can be technically proven, it will be needed on a large scale, and will need either a continuing high carbon price to ensure that it is used, or a mandated position in the merit order and close monitoring of carbon dioxide emissions. There is the telling point that attempts to discourage the consumption of fossil fuel does not remove the temptation to extract that fuel in the future (and might increase it by lowering the price). The obvious way to ensure that the carbon content of that fuel does not enter the atmosphere is to separate it and bury ithence the ultimate need for widespread CCS. 4 The energy environment for the 21st century is opaque and uncertainespecially in developing countries. Future energy prices are particularly hard to forecast with any precision, and even more so is the future of carbon pricing and climate change agreements. Providing sufficient energy to meet the requirements of a growing world population with rising living standards will be a challenge. Doing it without substantially exacerbating the risks of climate change will be even more challenging. It is likely to require a significant shift in the historic pattern of fossil-fuel use and a transformation of the global energy system. Technological development, however it unfolds, will almost certainly play a critical role in minimizing the costs of various GHG stabilization constraints to the global economy. The most recent research suggests that there is no obvious "silver bullet": the solution will comprise a variety of technologies on both the supply and demand side of the energy system (Richels and others 2007) . In the face of significant technological and market risks and uncertainties, prudence calls for technological diversification.
A broad portfolio of low-carbon technologies and energy sources needs to be investigated and developed as part of a general strategy to confront the growing energy problems of both industrial and developing countries (EC 2007) . Fuel switching, price-induced conservation and end-use efficiency, and expanded deployment of existing renewable technologies can provide significant opportunities for addressing carbon dioxide emissions and energy security in the shorter term, albeit at a potentially significant price tag depending on the speeds of deployment (IPCC 2007a) . 5 Over the longer term, it is very likely that other technologies will need to play a large role in managing the costs of transition to a low-carbon economy. Two such technologies that are considered likely by many to do some of the heavy lifting in the future are CCS and nuclear power. Major technological shifts like advanced nuclear power may require a long transition as learning-by-doing accumulates and markets expand. While nuclear power has low running costs and hence, once built, is attractive to continue to run, CCS attached to coal-fired generation raises running costs and without a strong carbon price signal it will be subject to bypass. Renewables continue to fall in price, and technological change, particularly for solar power, may make them commercially competitive at the kinds of carbon prices that reflect the likely social cost of climate change damage (Stern 2007) . They also share with nuclear power the attraction of low variable costs and hence a continuing incentive for use once built.
This paper focuses mainly on nuclear power because amongst the low-carbon technologies it is the most controversial and susceptible to instinctive rejection. My main objective is to review the issues that are relevant for the analysis of the pros and cons of nuclear energy. I am not arguing that other low or zero carbon technologies are inferior, only that a balanced portfolio approach that minimizes not just the expected cost but also the risk of excessive costs, will likely include nuclear power.
Electricity Demand and Alternative Sources of Electricity Supply
The life-cycle GHG emissions per unit of electricity from nuclear power are much lower than from either coal or gas generated power and comparable to those from solar and other renewables. Although nuclear power is a well-established technology for generating electricity, it has long been considered unattractive by many environmental groups and ordinary citizens. These unfavorable attitudes emanate from concerns about the potential hazards of reactor meltdowns (and their potentially catastrophic ecological and social impacts), unresolved issues related to nuclear waste disposal, and potential problems with diversion and proliferation of fissile material. Still, there is a revival of worldwide interest in nuclear power-a result of rapidly rising and volatile fossil fuel prices, concerns about the security of energy ( particularly gas) supplies, and global climate change.
Proponents argue that, in relation to the objectives of mitigating the threat of climate change, resource efficiency, and supply security, nuclear power performs very well. Nuclear power is seen as: (a) a well-established technology for generating electricity that has life-cycle GHG emissions as low as the best renewables such as wind; (b) amenable to significant scaling-up and thus can provide large amounts of power; and (c) using a natural resource (uranium) which is found in abundance (2-3 parts per million, ppm) in the earth's crust and, with advanced technologies, enough fuel could be provided to meet the world's electricity needs for several centuries (IAEA 2006; WNA 2008) .
Skeptics claim that nuclear power is a costly, complex source of energy (Thomas 2005; Greenpeace 2007) . It involves the use of highly toxic materials that must be kept secure from attack or theft; and a demonstrated viable technology for the permanent disposal or reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel does not yet exist. Moreover, even in a carbon-constrained world, nuclear power may be less economically attractive than many renewable options in favorable locations, as well as a host of decentralized energy efficiency and distributed generation technologies (Lovins 2005) .
Public opposition to nuclear power facilities and, in particular, their association with nuclear weapons is entirely understandable (UCS 2007). For nuclear power to gain greater public acceptance, become a significant option for mitigating GHG emissions, and meet growing needs for electricity supply, four critical challenges must be overcome: safety, waste, proliferation, and costs (MIT 2003) .
Projected Growth in Global Energy Demand
Over the next several decades global energy use is expected to rise substantially. Approximately one-half of the projected increase in world energy consumption in the IEO2008 (EIA 2008) reference case is attributed to electricity demand. Indeed, net electricity consumption is projected to nearly double between 2006 and 2030 (figure 1).
6 Over three-quarters of the reference forecast increase in electricity demand is expected to come from non-OECD countries, where electricity consumption is projected to increase by 3.8 percent a year during 2006 -2030 (compared with 1.1 percent in OECD countries), fueled in part by the doubling of urban populations over this period (IEA 2008b , EIA 2008 .
Fossil Fuel Supply Issues
Fossil fuels (oil, coal, and natural gas) supply most of the world's energy. Under business-as-usual scenarios, oil-the most convenient and multipurpose of these fuels-will continue to be the main source of energy, specifically for the transport sector, up to 2030. For electricity generation, coal and natural gas will remain the primary energy sources, with coal possibly increasing its market share from 41 to 44 percent (IEA 2008b) or 46 percent (EIA 2008) .
Based on current consumption, proven economic global reserves of coal will last another 143 years, natural gas 63 years, and oil 43 years (EIA 2008) . Probable reserves for oil and natural gas are substantially higher-by some estimates twice as great. Extracting these reserves will eventually become more difficult and costly, putting upward pressure on prices-though how quickly remains a matter of debate. Regardless of how rapidly prices rise, however, their volatility is likely to continue or increase. Indeed, the considerable strain experienced by world oil markets in recent years could be a harbinger of things to come. This recent market stress was due to the tight balance between supply and demand, a legacy of a period of under-investment during the previous decades of low prices, declining production from non-OPEC fields, and rising resource nationalism. The natural gas reserves needed to meet the growing demand are costly to access, constrained by the capacity of pipelines and liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers, and often needing routes through politically contested regions.
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There may be abundant unconventional fossil-fuel alternatives to oil and natural gas; and there is a consensus that undiscovered global coal reserves are huge. Oil sands and shale represent very significant potential fossil resources. In addition to being plentiful sources for power generation, these resources can be transformed into gaseous and liquid fuels using known technologies at manageable costs (Bartis and others 2008) . The problem is that all of these options are much more carbon dioxide intensive than conventional oil and gas alternatives, and even with CCS their carbon dioxide intensity is no lower than conventional fossil alternatives. Thus, they carry an even heavier GHG burden than conventional fuels. They also involve a range of local environmental problems from fuel extraction. The availability of these secure, economically feasible, yet environmentally unattractive options lies at the heart of the dilemma facing energy policymakers today.
The Challenging Transition to New Energy Sources
Market systems exhibit remarkable adaptability and flexibility, and market forces can play a crucial role in conserving scarce energy resources-directing them to their most valuable uses. The same price signals that balance supply and demand in the short run will signal profitable opportunities for, and help unlock, new approaches to energy production and use in the long run, provided they are allowed to respond to demand and supply-but too many developing countries respond to price shocks by capping domestic prices. In 2007, the IEA estimates that the 20 largest non-OECD countries paid energy subsidies of U.S. $310 billion. The world's economies will change in response to rising oil and natural gas prices. Shifts in the structure of economic activity and productivity improvements will reduce the energy intensity of those economies.
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Throughout history there has been a tendency to underestimate grossly the potential for technological developments that dampen the predicted doom from natural or human-made calamities. Technologies for energy supply (from oil exploration and recovery to solar PV), distribution, and use will likely improve significantly due to the improved incentives to engage in the relevant research. And if history is any guide, technology will help replace oil and natural gas use with cheaper alternatives before supplies run out as their prices rise.
9 But this transition to new energy sources will take time. And, unlike other such transitions in the past, it will be severely constrained by what is quickly becoming one of today's defining economic and political challenges-climate change due to GHG emissions.
Pressures Curtailing Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Coal-fired Electricity Generation
Approximately two-thirds of the world's electricity is generated using fossil fuels. 10 In 2006, fossil-fuel power plants emitted 11.4 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide accounting for 41 percent of the world total. In the IEA Reference Scenario, the carbon dioxide emissions of electricity will reach 16 gigatonnes in 2020 and 18 gigatonnes in 2030. Its share of world total carbon dioxide emissions will increase to 44 percent in 2020 and 45 percent in 2030. Electricity generation is projected to contribute half of the projected increase in energy-related carbon dioxide emissions to 2030 (IEA 2008b) . Per unit of output, coal-fired electricity generation produces nearly twice as much carbon dioxide as does natural gas. In 2005 coal overtook oil as the leading contributor to global energy-related carbon dioxide emissions (EIA 2008) .
The cost of heat energy (in importing countries) from coal has varied by a factor of six between 2000 and 2008-from U.S. $33/ton to U.S. $200/ton in north-west Europe, or from U.S. $1.4 to U.S. $8 per million British thermal units (BTUs) (IEA 2008c) . Coal within exporting countries is often considerably cheaper, particularly if it is of lower quality and far from ports, for example in Northern China and central India or near the main coalfield belt in Southern Africa. Gas prices have been similarly volatile over this period and also vary widely across countries, as it is costly to ship over long distances. U.S. gas prices for power production have varied from less than U.S. $3/million BTU in 2002 to nearly U.S. $12 in June 2008 before falling back to U.S. $5 in January 2009, while oil has been if anything even more volatile (and considerably more expensive for power production). Thus coal is generally the economic fuel of choice for baseload electricity generation-especially in countries with large deposits. Coal is not nearly as vulnerable to supply disruptions and price shocks as oil and natural gas, given the low costs of storage and the fact that most coal consumed is produced domestically. Thus, under normal circumstances, in countries with domestic coal reserves increased reliance on coal would be the obvious response to looming shortages of oil and natural gas and risks of interruptions in their supply. But converting all the coal in the ground into energy would generate enormous carbon dioxide emissions, with dangerous consequences for the earth's climate.
After years of intense debate, the question of whether climate change can be attributed to anthropogenic factors is almost resolved (IPCC 2007b) . Extensive data show that anthropogenic emissions over the past century have already caused a significant rise in global temperatures, relative to temperatures in their absence. Including 2006, six of the seven warmest years on record have occurred since 2001 and the 10 warmest years have occurred since 1995 (Princeton Environmental Institute 2007). Thus prudence dictates reversing the current course of rising energy-related carbon dioxide emissions. As evidence accumulates on the extent of human augmentation of the natural greenhouse effect, demands to reduce the carbon dioxide emissions from coal will increase considerably. In the IEA Reference Scenario, total coal-fired electricity generation is projected to increase from 7,756 terawatt-hours in 2006 to 14,600 terawatt-hours by 2030. In the 550 Policy Scenario, it reaches 9,700 terawatt-hours in 2030, 33 percent less than the Reference Scenario. In the 450 Policy Scenario, the 1,382 gigawatts of conventional coal-fired plants in use today are, to a considerable extent, replaced with CCS coal plants and other low-carbon technologies, and conventional coal generation is one-third of the Reference Scenario (IEA 2008b).
Potential Impacts of the Curtailing of Carbon Dioxide Emissions on Developing Countries
important because businesses and households use electric and electronic devices to perform an enormous range of tasks, basic and advanced. Thus adequate, reliable, and low-cost electricity is essential for modernization, growth, and international competitiveness in developing countries-and delivering it is among the most urgent challenges they face.
Today there is a huge global energy imbalance. Some 1.6 billion people lack access to electricity. Fortunately, efforts to curtail GHG emissions should not conflict with the aim of connecting the unconnected, as the following back-of-theenvelope calculation suggests. To supply an extra 1.6 billion people or 320 million households with an average household consumption of 1,200 kilowatt-hours/year will take 384 terawatt-hours/year or 2 percent of current consumption. For industrial countries, meeting the energy challenge of this century is central to maintaining high living standards; given the political will, lowcarbon options are affordable. For developing countries, the energy and climate change challenges put at stake the very sustainability of their economic development.
The Hurdles of Decarbonization and Sequestration Technologies
Carbon sequestration offers a possibility for reducing the carbon dioxide emissions associated with fossil fuel use, based on a two-step process of CCS. Proponents argue that there are no major technical obstacles to sequestering carbon dioxide in deep geologic formations or in the ocean (MIT 2007) .
11 Several pilot-scale plants have been or are being built (in the 10 -25 megawatt range, compared to the 300 -500 megawatt scale for commercial deployment), and there is growing experience of storing carbon dioxide in off-shore reservoirs such as in the Sleipner field. Various European union (EU) countries such as the United Kingdom are committed to larger scale trials in the near future, and the UK Climate Change Committee has argued that no coal-fired generation in the United Kingdom can operate without CCS post-2020, so that new-build coal-fired plants will need to be designed capture-ready. Until experience of commercial scale trials are available, the details on how and when this technology will be deployed must remain somewhat speculative. What is clear is that its required use will be massive, with hundreds of gigatons of carbon being stored over the course of this century and beyond (Dooley and others 2002) . The storage available in geologic and ocean reservoirs is probably sufficient to make CCS a viable mitigation option. But there are unresolved issues related to public perceptions about the long-term stability and environmental safety of such storage. Rapid escape of large amounts of carbon dioxide from geologic formations could pose a serious risk of asphyxiation to humans and animals, and cause substantial mechanical damage due to the huge amounts of compressive energy that would be stored in a typical reservoir.
12 Against that, natural gas has been stored under pressure in large reservoirs for geologic periods of time and clearly does not raise the same concerns. Gradual leaks may pose little danger, but they could still defeat the mitigation goals of sequestration.
13 Additional concerns include acidification of groundwater from carbon dioxide.
Retrofitting existing coal-fired plants to capture GHGs is very costly, although the costs can be reduced by designing the plant to be "capture-ready." Plants using "clean coal" technologies, such as integrated (coal) gasification combined cycle (IGCC) and other pre-or post-combustion plants with CCS that also remove sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions, are therefore more likely to be built from scratch. These new technologies, including sequestration, would raise the cost of generating electricity from coal by about half. Nevertheless, in a range of low-emission scenarios, CCS is predicted to play an important part in addressing the problem. The IEA scenarios contemplate actions to stabilize carbon dioxide concentrations at either 550 ppm ( ppm of carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere at which there is still a considerable risk of dangerous global warming) or 450 ppm (which lowers that risk considerably, but which is significantly more challenging). In both cases electricity is the key sector to decarbonize, as it requires the least change to behavior or other technology-low-carbon or "green" electricity is identical to electricity from any other source. Even under the 550 ppm scenario, the power sector will 
The Promises and Limitations of Renewable Energy Sources
Renewable energy sources are indigenous and abundant-and their use could significantly increase the long-term security of energy supplies and reduce GHG emissions. Governments have recognized that for the less mature technologies (solar, off-shore wind, wave, and tidal stream) current costs are both high (figure 2) and a poor guide to what is ultimately achievable.
14 Thus, they are actively supporting such technologies, through carbon prices, feed-in tariffs, and renewables obligations, and are beginning to address problems of intermittency through better grid design and management.
In 2006 renewables-based electricity generation amounted to 3,740 terawatthours or 18 percent of the total output. In the IEA Reference Scenario, it is projected to increase to 4,970 terawatt-hours in 2015 (overtaking gas as the world's second-largest source of electricity) and over 7,700 terawatt-hours by 2030, or 23 percent of the total. In the 550 Policy Scenario, renewables will play Kessides a major role, supplying more than 30 percent of total electricity by 2030; they achieve even faster deployment in the 450 Policy Scenario, reaching 12,000 terawatt-hours or 40 percent of the total electricity generation in 2030 (IEA 2008b) .
Hydroelectric power is the world's largest source of renewable electricity, with considerable unexploited potential. Less than a fifth of technically exploitable hydropower has been used to date (WEC 2007) . 15 Much of the potential for new (2004), and IEA/NEA (2005). The very broad cost ranges and the consequent overlap among alternative technologies are due to different assumptions across the studies regarding the weighted average cost of capital, plant construction time and economic life, load factor, fuel prices, and other pertinent economic and technical parameters. The rather precise estimate of oil reflects a particular assumption of that price, and while gas prices might move with oil prices, those of other technologies would be less tied to the oil price. The MIT study assumes that the debtequity ratio and the nominal cost of equity are different for nuclear, coal, and natural gas plants and adopts the following discount rates: 11.5 percent for nuclear and 9.6 percent for coal and natural gas plants; similarly, the UofC assumes that the cost of capital is 12.5 percent for nuclear and 9.5 percent for coal and natural gas. The other studies employ a common financing model and the same discount rate for the different generating technologies: 7.5 percent in the RAE study, 10 percent in the CETI study, 8 percent in the DGEMP study, and 5 percent and 10 percent in the OECD/NEA/IEA study. The price of natural gas is assumed to be $3.50/MBTU and $3.39MBTU in the MIT and UofC studies, E3.30/MBTU by the DGEMP, £2.18/GJ in the Royal Academy of Engineers, and Can$6.47/Mcf in Ayres and others. All these figures are subject to considerable reservation, as the cost of capacity also depends on materials prices, financial conditions, and the allocation of risk, which can be affected by regulatory regimes.
Source: IAEA (2006).
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The Hydropower has a very low GHG footprint, unless one counts the emissions from entrapped biomass, and it can give rise to important synergies with other renewable energies. Indeed, a natural synergy exists between hydroelectric generation and wind and solar power. Storage hydro and pumped storage can provide the firming capacity that is needed to smooth out the fluctuations and fill the supply gaps associated with these intermittent renewable resources. By enhancing the flexibility of the power system, the presence of quickly dispatchable hydropower could facilitate higher penetrations by intermittent renewable technologies without compromising system quality and security. Synergies might also develop with geothermal, marine power, and bio-generation, especially as these technologies undergo expanded deployment. global wind power capacity is projected to increase to 271 gigawatts in 2015 and 551 gigawatts by 2030; and global wind power output is projected to increase from 130 terawatt-hours (less than 1 percent of the total) in 2006 to more than 660 terawatt-hours (2.7 percent of the total) in 2015 and 1,490 terawatt-hours (4.5 percent of the total) in 2030. In the 550 Policy Scenario, wind supplies 1,947 terawatt-hours, or over 6 percent of the total, by 1930 (IEA 2008b).
Wind power is inexhaustible (as long as the sun shines on the earth unevenly).
17 Over the past 20 years its costs have dropped by more than 80 percent.
18 Thus utility-scale wind systems are rapidly becoming cost competitive relative to conventional fossil fuel generation plants, certainly at carbon prices that would be needed to deliver 550 ppm stabilization. The scale of wind power needed to make a material difference in stabilizing atmospheric carbon dioxide is considerable-the 550 gigawatts needed in the IEA Reference Scenario by 2030 represents 183,000 three-megawatt wind turbines (offshore turbines are likely to be larger, some onshore ones are smaller). Between 2025 and 2030 some 16,000 megawatts would be needed each year, requiring roughly 3,000-5,000 wind turbines (depending on size) or approximately 15 a day. Mackay's (2008) estimates indicate that in windy Britain in the best locations the average output might be around 16 gigawatt-hours per year per sq. km. Thus, to produce the 2,000 terawatt-hours per year in the 550 Policy Scenario, the land take would be 125,000 sq. km or 35 percent of the area of Germany, although offshore wind farms ( projected to supply one-quarter of the total) would lessen the pressure on alternative land uses. Moreover, the intermittency of wind generation presents major challenges for integrating it with the electricity grid on a large scale. Deployment beyond 20 percent of grid capacity would require some combination of significant spinning reserve capacity, adding to generation costs; much greater transmission capacity to link areas with different simultaneous wind strengths; or low-cost, large-scale energy storage that does not yet exist.
19 Thus both the area of suitable land (and accessible offshore locations) and the intermittency of wind power will ultimately limit its penetration-although penetrations as high as 30 percent can be achieved depending on local and national grid strength. The solar resource is ultimately the driver of all renewable energy, and is potentially enormous, providing only that it can be tapped efficiently and cost effectively. 20 The efficiency with which solar insolation can be transformed into energy varies widely, from less than 2 percent for biomass (before energy conversion losses) to a high of perhaps 20 percent for solar PV technology.
21 Although PV technology is advancing rapidly, it remains expensive relative to other electricity generation technologies, and the manufacturing of PV panels consumes significant energy. Moreover, PV technology suffers from diurnal variability and is least available when most needed (at least in temperate climates): in winter and after dark. In comparison with wind, its predictability requires less sophisticated system management to accommodate and where central heating loads are high there is a natural complementarity, but otherwise, even if apparently cost competitive, there may be hidden costs in raising reserve requirements to deal with winter peaks.
MacKay (2008) provides useful data to estimate the potential contribution that PV might make in various countries. Thus equipping all Britain's south-facing roofs with 20 percent efficient (still high by current standards) PV would generate approximately 100 terawatt-hours per year or 30 percent of current electricity consumption. Covering 1 percent of Britain's land area with 10 percent efficient PV panels (which is still twice the output per area of existing solar parks like that in Bavaria) would produce about 200 terawatt-hours per year. More ambitious plans, such as those of DESERTEC (see www.desertec.org) that would cover North Africa with CSP linked to Europe by high voltage DC power lines, provide estimates of the "economic potential" at 620,000 terawatt-hours per year with coastal potential at 6,000 terawatt-hours per year. The latter requires some 300 high voltage DC interconnectors, with an average power density of 15 megawatts per sq. km, and therefore 45,000 sq. km, or 8 percent of the area of Germany or 2 percent of the area of Algeria. 22 The obvious problem is the cost and noncoincidence of supply and demand in time and space.
Geothermal plants can operate around the clock and so do not face the intermittency problems of wind power and solar PV systems. But their development is limited to certain volcanic areas, although optimists consider that drilling down to the magma could tap huge supplies (see http://www.magma-power.com) enough in the (geologically favored) U.S. for 500 -5,000 years' energy supply. Mackay estimates that Britain might have access to minable hot rocks that could supply 20 terawatts per year, less than 10 percent of electricity demand. Thus geothermal resources are unlikely to become a major contributor to the world's energy supply, although they can make a sizeable contribution in specific locations.
23
By contrast, biomass (agricultural and forestry residues, energy crops, and wastes) offers a huge, continuously replenishing energy source. Substituting biomass for coal in electricity generation can reduce emissions of carbon dioxide and other GHGs. 24 The main impediment to expanding the use of biomass in electricity generation is the availability and cost of feedstock. Increased demands on land and water risk raising the cost of food and further damaging vulnerable populations. Mackay (2008) estimates that best European practice can generate 0.5 megawatts per sq. km, which, if burned at 40 percent efficiency to generate electricity, would produce 1.6 gigawatt-hours per year per sq. km, or less than 2 terawatt-hours per thousand sq. km. If 10 percent of Germany were devoted to biomass at this efficiency, it would produce less than 60 terawatt-hours or 10 percent of their electricity consumption. Nuclear Power: Promises Several factors are driving the global resurgence of interest in nuclear power: † A desire to make energy supplies more secure by diversifying fuel sources and reducing dependence on fuel imports, and to stabilize energy prices by reducing reliance on fossil fuels. † Pressures to reduce air pollution: nuclear power does not produce the airborne pollutants that fossil fuels do. † The increasing urgency of mitigating climate change by reducing GHG emissions: especially carbon dioxide (figure 3).
Proponents of nuclear power highlight the fact that, together with hydro and wind power, it is a currently proven producer of electricity that does not emit GHGs and can be scaled up quickly enough to replace baseload 25 fossil fuel electricity without the major environmental, 26 land use, or technological constraints impinging upon hydro, biomass, wind power, or solar-and so tackle the challenges of energy supply security and climate change. 27 At the current rate of use, with reactors operating on a once-through fuel cycle, 28 the world's present measured resources of uranium (4.7 million tons) will last about 70 years. The introduction of fast breeder reactors 29 and the recycling of plutonium from 
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The reprocessed spent fuel would increase the energy potential of today's uranium reserves by 50-fold or more (NEA 1998; IAEA 2006; UIC 2007a) . Energy security concerns were the main factor motivating the nuclear power build-up following the energy crises of the 1970s, especially in countries with limited energy resources. Such concerns have become even more pressing in recent years due to heightened geopolitical tensions.
The world energy markets have experienced considerable strain in recent years. Robust economic growth, especially in some large developing countries, has caused a significant structural shift in global demand for fossil fuels and a tightening balance between supply and demand. Indeed, the recent rise in and volatility of fossil fuel prices reflect a tightening balance of supply and demand, while Europe's concerns over gas security of supply have been reawakened by Russia's failure to secure satisfactory transit agreements through their near-eastern neighbors, such as the Ukraine. Certainly the new EU accession states have placed considerable emphasis on reducing their import dependence on Russia, and many view nuclear power as part of that solution.
Reducing the Costs of GHG Stabilization Constraints
In recent years, a variety of models has been used to estimate the impacts on the gross world product of stabilizing GHG concentrations in the earth's atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. 30 An important aspect of this modeling has been to assess the potential contributions that advanced technologies could make in achieving various atmospheric stabilization targets and minimizing the corresponding abatement costs. While these studies employ different modeling approaches, technology representations and climate policies, most of them seem to indicate that nuclear power has the technical and economic potential to play a significant role in emissions mitigation.
31 This is true even at relatively modest mitigation targets (for example, carbon dioxide concentrations of 750 ppm; figure 4). In the IEA Reference Scenario, world nuclear capacity is projected to increase from 368 gigawatts in 2006 to 433 gigawatts in 2030 and nuclear generation to rise from 2,793 terawatt-hours in 2006 to 3,458 terawatt-hours during the same period-although its share of total electricity generation falls from 15 percent in 2006 to 10 percent in 2030. In the 450 Policy Scenario, nuclear capacity reaches 619 gigawatts and nuclear generation rises to 4,000 terawatt-hours, or 14 percent of the total, by 2030. And in the 450 Policy Scenario, nuclear power capacity reaches 680 gigawatts and supplies over 5,200 terawatt-hours, or 18 percent of total electricity generation, by 2030. Thus, as we move to more stringent constraints on GHG concentrations, nuclear power makes a comparable contribution to CCS, hydro, and other renewables (IEA 2008b) .
The costs of stabilization increase substantially if nuclear power is excluded from the supply options. Difiglio and Gielen (2004) The Potential Benefits of "Keeping the Nuclear Option Open"
Previous work on the optimal degree of generating diversity has identified two principal macroeconomic benefits of fuel diversification and technology-mix: (i) nonfossil fuel technologies reduce fossil price risk and help avoid costly economic losses; and (ii) a diverse system is intrinsically more robust to supply shocks and thus diversification benefits security of supply (Stirling 2001; Awerbuch and Berger 2003) . In the face of the current disturbing trends in climate change caused by the anthropogenic emission of carbon dioxide and other GHGs, diversification into generating technologies that do not emit such gases will have the added climate-change mitigation benefit. Nuclear generation costs are fairly insensitive to oil, gas, and carbon prices.
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Nuclear power could, therefore, offer a hedge to an electric utility against the uncertainty and volatility and risk of oil, gas, and carbon prices. This hedging and the flexibility to choose between nuclear power and other generating technologies, as new information emerges about fossil-fuel supply conditions and evidence accumulates on global warming, creates an option value for nuclear power (Graber and Rothwell 2006; Rothwell 2006; Rothwell 2007) . This hedging value cannot be adequately taken into account in the context of the standard levelized life-cycle cost methodology. It requires a dynamic framework to capture fully the value of the flexibility of waiting for more information on the supply conditions of oil and gas and the policy toward carbon (Roques and others 2006) . However, any evaluation of the diversification of nuclear power has to take explicitly into account the countervailing inflexibility arising from the fact that the nuclear fuel cycle produces dangerous radioactive waste that "essentially lasts forever."
Facilitating the Transition to a Low-oil Transport Economy
In recent years interest in a transition from oil-based liquid fuels to some lowcarbon alternative, as the energy source for transportation, has grown markedly because of increased concerns about the volatility of oil prices, energy security, and climate change. Several candidates have been proposed, from bio-fuels in the near term, through hybrid electric vehicles in the medium run, to hydrogen as the energy vector used in fuel cells in some more distant vision (ANL 2003) . While the wide diffusion of hydrogen-based transportation would by itself reduce carbon dioxide emissions emanating from oil-based fuels, the net gain from such technological transformation depends critically on the production process of hydrogen fuels. Currently, most hydrogen is manufactured with an economical steam-reforming process from methane or natural gas. A key disadvantage of this process is that it releases large amounts of carbon dioxide, so the environmental advantage of the hydrogen fuel it produces is limited (Herring 2004) . Using electrolysis to split water into hydrogen and oxygen is the simplest (although not the most economical) way to produce hydrogen, and it releases no carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. However, if the electricity needed to produce hydrogen electrolytically is generated using fossil fuels, again the environmental advantage is nullified. It is argued that nuclear energy could be part of the solution by generating the large quantities of electricity needed to facilitate the transition to a hydrogen-based transportation system (Baurac 2004) . 34 It seems more likely that transport solutions will be derived directly from electricity (via batteries or in rail) than indirectly via hydrogen, at least in the next 20 -40 years, again strengthening the case for expanding the supply of low-or zero-carbon electricity.
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Nuclear Power: Perils Two accidents have indelibly marked the history of nuclear power, leaving impressions in the public mind that, many years later, still affect reactions to this form of energy: the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant (in Pennsylvania, the United States) and the 1986 accident at Chernobyl (in Ukraine). The environmental and health effects of the Chernobyl accident were far more severe than those from Three Mile Island. Those differences confirmed the critical importance of inherent safety features-especially a strong containment building enclosing the reactor's primary system. Although about half of the reactor core melted at Three Mile Island, the released radionuclides were mostly deposited on the inside surface of the plant or were dissolved in condensing steam. The containment building prevented any significant release of radioactive material. Except for some early Soviet-designed systems, most nuclear power plants currently operating have such containment buildings.
After the Three Mile Island accident, significant improvements were made to both operating and new reactors, making them much less vulnerable to accidents-whether due to equipment malfunctions or human error. The industry has developed many new reactor designs. To improve safety, the general design trend has been to add passive features that ensure responses to equipment malfunctions and other mishaps are founded on basic physical laws such as gravity and natural circulation-rather than engineered systems (such as safety pumps) or backup systems that rely on power availability or human intervention (Ahearne 2006; USNRC 2007) . In addition, there has been extensive global cooperation to improve the safety of Soviet-designed plants. So far, only two major accidents have occurred in more than 12,000 reactor-years of commercial operations in 32 countries. It is claimed that the newest plants would suffer no more than one incident of severe core damage for every 100,000 reactor-years of operations-and this without environmental release of radioactive material (UIC 2007b) .
The Chernobyl accident was unquestionably severe. Approximately 6 percent of the radioactive content of the reactor core was released into the atmosphere. The accident led to 31 short-term deaths and an additional 106 individuals experienced serious radiation effects. Around 200,000 workers who were engaged in cleanup activities during 1986 -87, received, on average, exposures double the yearly permitted occupational exposure and about the same level as individuals in high radon areas of Europe. The number of cleanup workers ultimately rose to 600,000, but most of the additional individuals received limited exposure. Some 116,000 inhabitants were evacuated from the 30 km exclusion zone around the plant site, but the majority (95 percent) of them received on average less exposure than the cleanup workers. The more than 400,000 inhabitants of areas classified as strict control zones received significantly less radiation exposure. The IAEA and World Health Organization estimated that out of the total of 1,116,000 individuals identified above, some 3,500 to 4,000 could eventually die from radiation-induced cancers, mainly late in life (Chernobyl Forum 2005; IAEA 2006 ). However, other groups have disputed these estimates as being too low (Greenpeace 2006).
Still, it is useful to compare the effects on human life of various electricity generation technologies per unit of electricity produced. A 1998 study by the Paul Scherrer Institut (commissioned by the Swiss Federal Office of Energy) of 4,290 energy-related accidents found that for each terawatt-year of production, hydropower caused 883 deaths, coal 342, natural gas 85, and nuclear power 8 (figure 5).
Nuclear power plants are also vulnerable to land-based assaults, deliberate aircraft crashes, and other terrorist acts. Such attacks could lead to the dispersal of large amounts of radioactive fission products, which could pose a direct radiation hazard, contaminate soil and vegetation, and be ingested by humans and animals.
The Challenges of Nuclear Waste Disposal
The nuclear fuel cycle produces a variety of radioactive waste, including low-and intermediate-level waste, transuranic waste, and spent fuel and high-level waste. 35 The spent fuel and high-level waste create by far the most serious problems and so dominate the debate.
For political, social, technical, and economic reasons, the issue of nuclear waste disposal is extremely complex. Today, more than 40 years after the first Kessides commercial nuclear plant became operational, no country has yet succeeded in disposing of high-level waste-the longest lived, most highly radioactive, and most technologically challenging of the waste streams generated by the nuclear industry (MIT 2003) . Because such waste poses danger to current and future generations, the public is understandably apprehensive. Indeed, public attitudes toward nuclear energy are strongly influenced by concerns about waste disposal.
36 Thus the spent fuel or high-level waste management could and should be a significant consideration in the discussion of the potential for expanded nuclear deployment. Current research is examining the use of accelerator-driven systems to reduce the volume and radioactive toxicity of nuclear waste (Brolly and Vertes 2004; Gokhaleb, Deokatteya, and Kumar 2006) . Because of the potential future uses of materials in spent nuclear fuel, disposal programs strive to ensure the retrievability of such waste, and research and development programs are aimed at achieving this goal.
The challenges of nuclear waste disposal remain a potent impediment to the expansion of nuclear power around the world. Some technical solutions for the safe storage of spent fuel have been proposed. Deep geologic formations are the preferred technical solution, and most countries have selected or are selecting sites as permanent repositories, with appropriate studies and permits. But institutional obstacles remain formidable, and the public's aversion to having a repository in its "backyard" continues. Citizens of countries planning to install or expand nuclear power units can be expected to ask questions about plans for safe, sustainable storage and disposal of nuclear waste.
Many countries have opted to reprocess spent fuel, not so much to extend the resource as to reduce and simplify radioactive waste management. In 2006 the U.S. administration announced that it would move toward that option. Some developing countries that seem poised to accelerate the expansion of nuclear power are apparently intending to store waste first onsite for a fairly long time-and expecting to ship spent fuel to its country of origin or to countries willing to accept it for a fee. Sending spent fuel back to the supplier for storage or other handling fits well into a strategy of nonproliferation, as it removes the potential for spent fuel to be used to produce nuclear weapons. However, such decisions may shift with changes of political regimes.
Presently, the global public remains deeply skeptical about nuclear waste disposal. There is considerable justification for the expressed skepticism. Although experimental and pilot facilities have been built, there are no operating high-level waste repositories and all countries have encountered significant difficulties with their waste management programs. Implementation of geologic repositories has proven a highly demanding task that has placed considerable stress on operating, regulatory, and political institutions. The Proliferation Risks of Expanded Nuclear Deployment All civilian nuclear power plants and their associated fuel cycles employ dual-use technology that can serve both military and nonmilitary purposes. Two points of the nuclear power cycle in particular form sensitive links between civilian uses and weapons applications: uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing.
The extent to which nuclear power will prove an acceptable and enduring option for meeting the future energy requirements in many regions of the world will depend in part upon the ability of the international community to minimize the associated proliferation risks (APS 2005) . The common fear is that such an expansion will increase the risk that weapons-usable fissile materials, facilities, technology, or expertise might be diverted or stolen and thus make it easier for countries to acquire technology as a precursor to developing nuclear weapons capability or for terrorist groups to obtain nuclear materials. This risk could be further compounded by the likelihood that plutonium-fueled breeder reactors will be widely used to stretch uranium resources under expanded nuclear power deployment. Proliferation could prove to be the Achilles heel of a global nuclear energy expansion.
Technical (Intrinsic) Barriers to Proliferation
Over the past three decades several attempts have been made to develop alternative nuclear technologies and cycles with greater resistance to proliferation. These efforts have focused on: † Advanced reactor designs, new fuels, or both which allow very high burnup and produce less plutonium than current reactors (such as, for example, the pebble-bed high-temperature, gas-cooled reactor). † Breeder or particle-accelerator-driven reactors that collocate sensitive activities and processes with the reactor, and do not separate the plutonium from other actinides.
Analyses of various reactor cycles have shown that all have some potential for diversion-that is, there is no proliferation-proof nuclear power cycle (APS 2005).
Reactor concepts that do not require refueling (have 15 -20 years of core life), especially under a hub-and-spoke architecture, could enhance proliferation resistance (Wade 2005) . Small innovative reactors (SIRs) have special attributes that make them more proliferation resistant than the larger, conventional nuclear reactors. These attributes include infrequent refueling, restricted access to nuclear fuel, and elimination of the host country needs or rationale to construct facilities that could be diverted from civilian to military purposes and ultimately used for clandestine production of nuclear material (Greenspan and Brown 2001) .
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Another advantage claimed for the SIRs is that they can be constructed more rapidly and track actual capacity needs, especially in developing countries, more closely. Thus some observers believe that there is significant scope for improving intrinsic barriers to proliferation through high-burnup fuels (including uranium and thorium), nonfertile fuels, closed fuel cycles, high-temperature gas-cooled reactors, and SIRs (Baker Institute 2001; INL 2002) .
Complementary Institutional (Extrinsic) Measures
Over the past 35 years, IAEA's safeguards system under the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty has proven fairly effective in restraining the diversion of fuel-cycle materials and facilities from civilian to military uses. 37 Indeed, the adoption of institutional measures to mitigate proliferation risks has played a key, if not dominant, anti-proliferation role. Consequently, there is an emerging consensus that most of the progress made toward improving proliferation resistance can be attributed to the increased authority accorded to the IAEA to detect clandestine facilities and undeclared operations within declared facilities. This includes the statutory authority provided through the "Additional Protocol" to the existing agreements governing IAEA's safeguards system (CGSR 2000) .
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Under a robust global nuclear power expansion program, there will be increasing pressures on countries to reprocess and recycle. While reprocessing and recycling have advantages in terms of resource utilization and spent fuel disposal, they will require strong process safeguards against misuse, diversion, or theft. Reactor-grade plutonium is weapons usable, whether by unsophisticated proliferators or by states seeking nuclear weapons capability. Thus, the primary challenge is to account and control adequately for weapons-usable material during normal operations of the nuclear energy system; and to monitor, detect, and prevent process modification or facilities diversion to produce or acquire such material (USDoE 1997; MIT 2003) .
International or Multinational Energy Parks
One potential way of mitigating the proliferation risks of expanded nuclear deployment might be through the adoption of hub-and-spoke configurations that restrict all sensitive activities (such as isotope separation of uranium or reprocessing of spent fuel) to large, international/regional energy parks which would export fuel, hydrogen, and even small (40 -50 megawatts) sealed reactors to client states (Feiveson 2001; Kursunoglu and Mintz 2001) . At the end of their core life (say 15-20 years) the reactors would be returned to the central park unopened. Thus during the years of operation there would be no refueling and consequently the client countries would need no fuel fabrication facilities and management capabilities. To the extent that such modular reactors would operate almost autonomously, the hub-and-spoke architecture could reduce substantially the rationale and opportunities for countries to develop nuclear research laboratories and train technical specialists and scientists whose know-how could later be diverted to weapons activities (Feiveson and others 2008) .
Although international energy parks and the hub-and-spoke nuclear architecture are technically feasible, they could prove politically very difficult to implement. Countries might view these arrangements as encroaching upon their energy independence. Moreover, the hub-and-spoke system would require the spoke countries to accept restrictions on their nuclear activities that would not be similarly imposed on the countries hosting the nuclear parks. Inevitably, such restriction would be viewed as being discriminatory, unless all countries (including the advanced industrial ones) were willing to accept a high degree of international control over their nuclear energy programs.
The Economics of Nuclear Power
In a deregulated global electricity marketplace, economics will be a key consideration in future decisions to build new nuclear plants. Thus assessing the forwardlooking cost elements of nuclear power and the uncertainties underlying those cost estimates is key to evaluating its potential role in balancing the electricity supply and demand over the next several decades and mitigating the threat of climate change. Even if countries decide that the challenge of decarbonizing the electricity sector requires more state control, economics will continue to be important, although the perceived costs of risk might then be somewhat lower.
One of the fundamental problems underlying the debate on the potential role of nuclear power in meeting the future global energy needs relates to the continuing lack of consensus on what will be the costs of new nuclear-generating plants-and this is only likely to be resolved with accumulating information about the full costs of new nuclear build (Rothwell 1992) .
Past trends would lead observers to assume a modest nuclear power component in the future global energy mix: the simple fact is that no new nuclear plants have been built in the United States and Europe for more than two decades. Skeptics point out that by the early 2000s, nuclear plants ended up achieving less than 10 percent of the capacity and 1 percent of the new orders (all from countries with centrally planned energy systems) that were forecast a quarter of a century before. They claim that this fact demonstrates nuclear power has not been commercially attractive (Lovins and Lovins 2001) .
The history of construction of nuclear plants is replete with huge cost overruns. The specter of increasing construction times (table 1), especially from the late 1980s until 2000, and the consequent high construction costs was a major Kessides cause of the lack of commercial interest in investment in new nuclear plants. This is evidenced by the significant decline in construction of new nuclear plantsfrom a peak of over 30 gigawatts of new capacity per year in the 1980s to an average of 4 gigawatts per year during the last decade (figure 6).
Part of this can be explained by the sharp fall in the real cost of relevant fuel and the dramatic improvement in gas turbine technology that undermined the apparent cost advantage of nuclear power compared to oil-fired generation in the aftermath of the 1970 oil shocks, while the escalation of construction costs had much to do with the growing safety concerns after Three Mile Island (and later Chernobyl). 
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The World Bank Research Observer, vol. 25, no. 2 (August 2010) Critics of nuclear energy point out that the promises made by some in the nuclear industry in the mid-1950s for cheap power ("power too cheap to meter") have seldom been kept (Greenpeace 2007). The nuclear industry is claiming that it has learned from its past mistakes. Joskow (2006a) argues that in recent years nonfuel operation and maintenance costs have fallen significantly, plant capacity factors have increased dramatically, and safety has improved considerably as well. Moreover, it is argued that improved big-project management techniques and new plant designs hold considerable promise for lower and more predictable construction times and costs, particularly for successor projects to the first of a kind.
The economics of nuclear power depend heavily on the long-term real discount rate, the cost of alternative fuels, the cost of carbon, and the cost of capital (including the time cost of the construction period). All of these factors had changed by early 2008, altering the economics of nuclear power in recent years. Specifically: † The weighted average cost of capital had fallen, particularly for long-dated indexed instruments, where the demand by pension funds exceeds supply, driving down the longer-term rates. † Oil prices, and to a considerable extent natural gas prices, had risen sharply and were not forecast to return to the previous benchmark of U.S. $25 per barrel. Gas ( preferably pipeline, but even LNG) has been the preferred fuel for many new power projects, and these have become substantially more costly. † Carbon prices in the EU had risen to E20 per ton of carbon dioxide (U.S. $90 per ton of carbon) partly in response to the rising price of natural gas, which increases demand for coal-fired generation and hence increases the demand for EU Emission Allowances, driving up the price of carbon. † Standardized reactor design and streamlined licensing procedures held out the prospect of reduced construction time and costs, longer operating life, simpler operations and maintenance (O&M), and improved productivity of nuclear plants (in terms of capacity factors, operating costs, and safety indicators).
Since then the world's most serious financial crisis since the Great Depression has changed the financial landscape and put equity finance for new investment in a perilous state. Energy prices have fallen, the return to savers has collapsed, but the cost of borrowing has remained stubbornly high as credit risk has dramatically increased and projections of future GDP growth have been slashed, all developments that would appear inimical to capital intensive electricity investment, particularly for nuclear power. There are several possible reactions to this combination of circumstances. Major industrialized economies might reasonably argue that stimulating investment demand to match the need of the private sector to increase savings is a better solution to a recession than stimulating consumption and thereby increasing public and private net debt (that is, debt not offset by valuable Kessides assets). Given that the real cost of borrowing to the public sector is low, that the demand for low-carbon energy is as pressing as ever, and the desirability of stimulating investment is therefore high, there is a case for redoubling efforts to increase investment in the low-carbon future. If this cannot be done readily with the current financial and energy market structures, other mechanisms may be needed. One potentially attractive possibility would be a public financial institution that would issue electricity bonds to the public, paying for example the value of 1,000 kilowatt-hours of retail electricity (suitably defined) per bond. These would have the attractions of indexed public debt (possibly greater, as they would provide a hedge against a particular and important price risk, that of volatile electricity prices). As such they could be issued at a low real interest rate and would provide an ideal form of finance for a reliable electricity generator, particularly one not dependent on the prices of fuel and carbon-such as renewables and nuclear power.
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The relative costs of nuclear power, coal, and combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) generation have been extensively analyzed in several recent studies. There is a consensus that in deregulated markets, nuclear power is not now cost competitive with coal and natural gas without an adequate carbon price and suitable financial/contractual arrangements (Finon and Roques 2008) . However, plausible reductions by industry in capital cost, operation and maintenance costs, and construction time could reduce the gap. Carbon emission credits, if enacted by government, can give nuclear power a cost advantage (MIT 2003; see figure 7 ). 
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The World Bank Research Observer, vol. 25, no. 2 (August 2010) While recent studies point to improved economics of nuclear power, their analysis highlights considerable uncertainty surrounding the economic appraisal of potential nuclear investments, mainly because of disparate forecasts of construction cost and fossil fuel and carbon prices. Part of the disparity relates to the date of forecast, as nuclear plant construction costs, even more than that of other generation plant costs, escalated very rapidly relative to other prices in the period 2005 -08. With recent falls in steel and other prices, this may well change again. Other sources of uncertainty relate to the ever-changing information about the costs and delays of constructing the EPR Olkiluoto 3 plant in Finland. 41 There is an urgent need to model this uncertainty and assess the economic viability of nuclear power under a range of scenarios reflecting different assumptions relating to plant construction costs, costs of uranium and alternative fossil fuels and their real rates of escalation over time, and carbon prices or taxes.
Components of Nuclear Power Costs and Levelized Costs of Alternative Baseload Generation Technologies
The costs of nuclear power comprise four major components.
42 † Capital or construction costs: The costs incurred during the planning, preparation, and construction of a new nuclear power station. † O&M: It relates to administration, management, support and upkeep of a power station (labor, material and supplies, spares, insurance, security, planned maintenance and contractor services, licensing and regulatory fees, and corporate overhead costs). † Fuel costs: It reflects the cost of fuel for the power station. † Back-end costs: The costs related to the decommissioning of the plant at the end of its operating life and the long-term management and disposal of radioactive waste.
Much of the uncertainty surrounding nuclear power's future costs relates to construction cost-the most important component (roughly two-thirds) of total generating costs. The industry has a notoriously poor historical record on construction cost estimation, realization, and time to build. Indeed, the construction of most nuclear plants around the world has been plagued with delays and substantial cost overruns. In the United States, for example, the final costs of plants that commenced commercial operations in the late 1970s were in some cases several times greater than their initial cost estimates (table 2) . Costs escalated dramatically as the industry scaled up its building rate and the size of plants. There has also been a global trend in increasing construction times (table 1) . Prior research has identified several explanatory factors for the observed uncertainty and miscalculation or escalation of construction costs: (i) incorrect
Kessides understanding of economies of scale-early cost projections tended to ignore the potential diseconomies of scale due to the increased complexity and greater management requirements of larger nuclear plants; (ii) design flaws that necessitated costly redesign and caused significant construction delays which at a time of high interest rates substantially increased the cost of build; (iii) an unwieldy licensing process and burdensome and ever-increasing regulatory requirements, often changing in mid-course, leading to regulatory turbulence and construction delays; (iv) nonuniform designs which inhibited the exploitation of economies of volume and further compounded the complexity of the licensing process (Zimmerman 1982; Cantor and Hewlett 1988) . The nuclear industry has put forward very optimistic construction cost estimates based on simpler plant designs (including innovative reactors incorporating passive safety systems) and shorter build times facilitated by improved construction methods, standardization of reactors, learning-by-doing, and a more predictable licensing process. During the past 15 years there have been few new nuclear plants constructed around the world, and most of those have been in Asia, mostly in countries with low-wage costs, such as China and Korea. Thus, there is very limited actual cost experience to verify the industry's projections. Still, the standardization of France's and Japan's reactor programs, and the evolutionary design innovations in South Korea's nuclear plants, seem to indicate significant construction and operating learning effects. 43 And most recent studies assume construction cost improvements relative to historic levels (table 2) that closely match optimistic but plausible forecasts. Nevertheless, it is argued by some that the industry's quoted construction cost projections (based on largely nontransparent engineering cost calculations) for the future nuclear build should be viewed with some skepticism and be subjected to very vigorous analysis (Joskow 2006b ). Note: The overnight construction cost is the hypothetical cost of a generating plant if it could be built instantly ("overnight"): it does not reflect inflation, the costs of construction financing, or the length of time that it takes to build the plant and associated cash flows. There has been no new nuclear construction in the United States after the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island.
Source: Joskow (2006b).
Economies of Scale and the Economics of Smaller Sized Nuclear Reactors
Most of the nuclear reactors currently in operation are medium-to large-scale plants sized at 500 -1,500 megawatts, utilizing tested technologies. The first generation nuclear power plants had a capacity of about 400 -500 megawatts. However, because of the general belief that nuclear power operations are characterized by significant economies of scale at the plant level, there was a definite trend toward larger units. By the mid-1960s, the industry scaled up to about 800 megawatts and, before those units were completed, new ones with capacities of over 1,300 megawatts were planned and constructed (Cantor and Hewlett 1988) . What type of nuclear energy is likely to emerge under the expanded global deployment scenario? The power grids in many developing countries that could consider nuclear power are not large enough to support deployment of very large units. Power systems science dictates that no single unit should be larger than about 15 percent or at most 20 percent of system demand. This implies that the 1,000 megawatts size unit, the smallest of the three reactor types currently being actively promoted in the international market, cannot be considered in systems with a peak demand lower than about 5,000 megawatts. These considerations suggest that there may be considerable scope for small size reactors that would permit a more incremental investment than the large units of the past and provide a better match to the limited grid capacity of many developing countries (Schock, Brown, and Smith 2001) . 44 It is argued that smaller reactors could offer significant advantages in terms of overall simplicity, modularity and speed of build, passive safety features, proliferation resistance, and reduced financial risk. However, the other side of the coin is that such small plants may not be economic because they will not be able to exploit important economies of scale. And in any case, most of the cost estimates for small nuclear reactors have not yet been tested by actual construction and operation. Only time and experience will verify the claims made by vendors and the industry.
The Nexus between Electricity Market Structure and the Commercial Attractiveness of Nuclear Power
Until recently, no new nuclear power station had been commissioned in a liberalized electricity industry. In deregulated, competitive electricity markets, it is power-company investors and not ratepayers who must bear the bulk of the financial risk of new generating capacity. While some of the risks associated with the future value of electricity can be shifted to consumers and marketers with forward contracts, power-company investors will continue to bear some of the market risk and all of the construction cost, operating cost, performance, and Kessides residual regulatory risk (MIT 2003; Joskow 2006a ). In such a market environment, investors will naturally tend to favor less capital intensive and shorter construction lead-time investments. For nuclear power, construction accounts for most of the costs, whereas for gas-fired generation fuel is the largest component (figure 8).
Moreover, nuclear power lead times are, for engineering and licensing reasons, much longer than those of alternative baseload technologies-especially CCGT but also coal-fired generation. Thus, the redistribution of risk among different stakeholders is likely to make nuclear generation unattractive for private investors, even when its levelized costs are similar to those of the alternative technologies.
45 Taylor (2007) argues that the risk profile of merchant nuclear power with high fixed costs, typically fixed fuel-cycle costs and back-end costs, facing a volatile electricity price, requires a low debt -equity ratio as it is effectively more highly leveraged than conventional plants and that it has taken the collapse of British Energy to demonstrate this fact to the financial sector. Finon and Roques (2008) argue that the choice of contractual and financial arrangements for new nuclear build in liberalized markets will need to change, and that a consumers' consortium with credit-worthy participants (the Finnish model for Olkiluoto 3) is the most favorable arrangement. The model of indexed electricity bonds mentioned above represents a way of delivering the same advantages as the Finnish model (which depended on large industrial customers with long time horizons) and deserves investigation. The vertically integrated utility model that allows risks to 
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The World Bank Research Observer, vol. 25, no. 2 (August 2010) at International Monetary Fund on September 15, 2010 wbro.oxfordjournals.org be shifted on to final consumers also has obvious attractions in lowering the effective cost of capital which is such a large element in the cost of nuclear power.
Summary
Increasing concerns related to energy supply security and widespread perceptions about the urgency of mitigating climate change are generating significant challenges in the global energy policy framework. Because of the shortage of low-cost substitutes for high carbon-emitting technologies, supplying the world's energy needs while stabilizing GHG emissions to prevent dangerous climate change is likely to prove a great challenge. If this challenge is to be met in a cost-effective way and not be disruptive to economic growth, it will almost certainly require contributions from a combination of existing, improved or transitional, and advanced technologies on both the supply and demand side of the energy system to (i) increase efficiency in electricity use; (ii) expand the deployment of renewable technologies; (iii) effect CCS; and (iv) expand nuclear power. However, many of these technologies confront substantial hurdles and would need to meet a complex array of conditions before they could be successfully implemented.
Within this context of the urgent need to develop a full arsenal of low-carbon energy technologies, nuclear power is viewed by some with a great deal of skepticism and in fact it continues to elicit considerable opposition from various electorates. Since the views on nuclear power remain highly divergent, the debate about its re-emergence requires a fresh, careful, and objective assessment of its costs (risks) and benefits. The consideration of nuclear power as a significant lowcarbon supply option requires addressing four critical issues: cost, safety, waste, and proliferation. There is an urgent need for further research to assess what progress has been made on addressing these challenges and the implications for costs and benefits, so as to inform the debate on the viability of nuclear power as an important ingredient in the world's clean energy development in the coming decade.
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2. It should be noted, however, that these high penetration rates are often the result of direct or indirect subsidies.
3. The reserve capacity requirement becomes onerous only when wind penetration exceeds a certain threshold level which in turn depends on the extent to which the grid is integrated (both within the country and also regionally).
4. Optimists might hope for other means of extracting carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, perhaps by burying biomass, but it is normally cheaper to extract gases where their concentration is highest, for example in the flu gases.
5. The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change highlights the following mitigation technologies and practices as being currently commercially available: improved supply and distribution efficiency; nuclear power; renewable heat and power (hydropower, solar, wind, geothermal, and bioenergy); and early applications of CCS. And CCS for gas, biomass and coal-fired electricity-generating facilities, advanced nuclear power, and advanced renewable energy (tidal and wave energy, concentrating solar, and solar PV) are considered likely to play an important role and to be commercialized before 2030 (IPCC 2007a).
6. Energy demand is sensitive to relative prices. The long-run demand growth projections cited above depend on specific assumptions about relative prices. In a more careful and complete treatment of global energy demand, these assumptions would have to be spelled out more clearly. However, such a detailed demand analysis is outside the scope of this paper.
7. This constraint is probably not binding at present. 10. In 2006, coal-fired generation worldwide reached 7,756 terawatt-hours, over 40 percent of the total; gas-fired generation reached 3,807 terawatt-hours, 20 percent of the total; and generation based on oil products reached around 1,140 terawatt-hours, 6 percent of the total. In South Africa and Poland the share of coal-fired generation is above 90 percent; in China and Australia it is approximately 80 percent; in India it is more than two-thirds; and it is about one-half in the United States and Germany (IEA 2008a).
11. Although the MIT study is dated 2007, it has not obviously been superseded by any better cost estimates, and that is likely to remain the case until commercial trial data are available.
12. The compressive energy stored during the 30-year operating life of a carbon dioxide disposal project associated with a 1,000 megawatt coal-fired plant would be equivalent to the energy content of more than 1 megaton of dynamite.
13. Leaving fossil fuel in the ground maintains the risk that it will be burned and carbon dioxide released, whereas leaving carbon dioxide in the ground at most runs the risk that it will be released as it would have been if the fuel had been burned conventionally, and as such is not a cogent argument compared to the health risks of sudden release.
14. It should be noted that the estimates presented in figure 2 need to be revised because, from early 2004 until the beginning of 2008, strong global demand led to sharp increases in the prices of materials, basic inputs, and equipment in the energy sector. This escalation in the cost of basic materials and equipment, coupled with a rise in the cost of craft labor, led to significant increases in the construction costs of generating facilities. For example, during 2006-08, the energy projects financed by the World Bank experienced 30 -50 percent increases above the original cost estimates (ESMAP 2008) . However, during the past few months in the face of the worst global financial crisis since the Great Depression, the prices of materials and energy have reversed their recent trend and begun declining. Thus, the projections of future prices need to be revised. Moreover, the interplay of technological progress and changes in the level of demand relative to other structural characteristics of the markets for equipment and other basic inputs of generating plants have differential impacts across the different energy submarkets. For example, the prices of land-based and offshore wind turbines have been increasing in the last 3 years due to the rising costs of materials and capacity constraints in the wind-power market. The prices of solar panels, on the other hand, have been declining and are poised for further sharp drops mainly due to rapid technological change and the exploitation of important scale economies.
15. The global technically exploitable hydropower capability is estimated to be 16,494 terawatthours (WEC 2008) , although the economically exploitable capability might be considerably less.
16. Water resources are closely linked to climate change. Thus, the potential vulnerability of hydropower to global warming needs to be carefully examined (Iimi 2007) .
17. Wind power potential in 2000 was estimated to be approximately 72 terawatts (Archer and Jacobson 2005) .
18. See www.awea.org/faq/cost.html. 19. The United Kingdom is fortunate in having a low correlation of wind speed at modest distances, reducing the country-wide problem of intermittency to manageable levels even at penetration rates of 25 percent or more. In Europe, Danish and North German wind power can cause current surges through neighboring countries, but with better information exchange and system operation these can be managed considerably better than at present.
20. The sun supplies the earth with a staggering amount of energy-in 1 hour it delivers the amount of energy that humans use annually. This enormous power that the sun continuously delivers to earth, 1.2 Â 10 5 terawatts, dwarfs every other source of energy-for example in 2006 global power-generation capacity was just over 4 terawatts (Crabtree and Lewis 2007) .
21. Typical solar panels have an efficiency of about 10 percent and more expensive ones can perform at 20 percent. The efficiency of PV systems is limited by the underlying laws of physics to a best of 60 percent with perfect concentrating mirrors and 45 percent without mirrors. Achieving 30 percent efficiency with a mass produced device would be remarkable (MacKay 2008).
22. CSP has a lower power density per unit area than PV (Mackay 2008) . 23. The same can be said of solar thermal power. 24. For example, biomass-integrated gasification combined-cycle-generating plants can reduce nitrogen oxide emissions by a factor of six relative to average pulverized coal-fired plants.
25. Baseload power is that part of electricity supply that is continuous and does not vary over a 24-hour period, and thus is approximately equivalent to the minimum daily load. It is normally the power source with the lowest variable cost. Wind has virtually zero variable cost and is intermittent, and so can displace other power when operating, but cannot be relied upon to meet firm demand. Run-of-river hydropower has zero variable cost and must be used or lost (like wind) but may be seasonal, while storage hydro with spare reservoir capacity may appear to have zero variable cost but can have a high opportunity cost as it can serve to provide peak power and to store excess wind power.
26. Assuming that problems of waste storage can be adequately addressed. 27. Wind power in favorable locations (with access to a wide area grid and storage hydro) can also be scaled up and provide base load power (at zero variable cost). Hydropower typically requires long-distance transmission but can be complementary to wind power that is often in similarly isolated locations.
28. When reactors operate in a "once-through" mode, the fuel is used once and then sent directly to disposal without further processing.
29. These are rectors that are configured to produce more fissile material than they consume, using fertile material such as depleted uranium in a blanket around the core.
30. These models include among others the Integrated Global Systems Model of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; the Model for Evaluating the Regional and Global Effects (MERGE) of GHG reduction policies developed at Stanford University and the Electric Power Research Institute; and the MiniCAM Model of the Joint Global Change Research Institute.
Kessides 31. Four radiative forcing stabilization scenarios have figured prominently in the climate change literature. These include limits on long-term radiative forcing (relative to pre-industrial times) of 3.4, 4.7, 5.8, and 6.7 watts per sq. m which would correspond roughly to carbon dioxide concentrations of 450 ppm, 550 ppm, 650 ppm, and 750 ppm.
32. In the ACT scenario, technologies that are currently available or are in an advanced state of development, bring global carbon dioxide emissions back to the current levels by 2050.
33. Capital costs, particularly steel and concrete, can increase with fossil energy costs. However, these costs once sunk have no further effect on running costs.
34. In the future, advanced gas-cooled, high-temperature reactors that operate at about 900 degrees Celsius could be used to produce hydrogen more efficiently through high-temperature thermochemical cracking of water.
35. Waste classification is based on the concentration of radioactivity it contains (Rahn and others 1984) .
36. A recent survey in 25 EU countries found that 6 in 10 citizens acknowledge the benefits of using nuclear energy-for diversifying energy supplies, reducing dependence on oil, and cutting greenhouse emissions. Still, only 37 percent were in favor of using nuclear energy, while 55 percent were opposed. But if the issues related to radioactive waste disposal were resolved, 38 percent of those opposed to nuclear energy would change their opinions (Botella and others 2006) .
37. The International Safeguards are a set of activities that the IAEA uses to verify that a country is adhering to international commitments not to use its nuclear program for nuclear weapons purposes. The safeguards system is based on regularly verifying the accuracy and completeness of a country's declarations to the IAEA concerning nuclear-related activities and seeking to assure that no undeclared nuclear materials or activities exist within the country. In total, presently more than 900 declared facilities in 71 countries are "safeguarded" and subject to inspection (APS 2005) .
38. The Additional Protocol is a legal document granting the IAEA complementary inspection authority to that provided in underlying safeguards agreements. A principal aim is to enable the IAEA inspectorate to provide assurance about both declared and possible undeclared activities. Under the Protocol, the IAEA is granted expanded rights of access to information and sites, as well as additional authority to use the most advanced technologies during the verification process (www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html).
39. Commercial operators might find a final consumer appetite for bonds indexed to the price of electricity (a liquid substitute for a long-term contract)-provided of course the company issuing the debt were sound. Given the essential nature of electricity demand, and a reasonably well-defined cost base (compared to property backing subprime mortgages), it should be possible to reduce risks considerably.
40. The costs of decommissioning modern reactors are modest and would likely be a charge on the reactor to be managed by a decommissioning fund.
41. The prices of new power stations remain volatile-after a rapid escalation between 2000 and 2008 they now appear to be falling back, as the price of steel has fallen with the recession and so has demand for and hence pressure on the prices of plants.
42. The direct costs do not include those associated with accidents and proliferation. 43. Japan's last six reactors built between 1997 and 2005 varied between U.S. $2,700 per kilowatt and U.S. $3,700 per kilowatt and took between 50 and 95 months from start of construction to criticality. The last three reactors built in China cost between U.S. $1,800 per kilowatt and U.S. $2,700 per kilowatt with construction times falling to 50 months. Korea's last four reactors decreased steadily in cost from U.S. $2,200 per kilowatt to U.S. $1,600 per kilowatt with construction times falling from 62 months to 48 months (Matzie 2005 ). Matzie argues that Korea's performance has resulted from standardization, localization, and low labor costs.
44. The IAEA defines as "small" those reactors with power less than 300 megawatts. 45. Clearly these biases against nuclear are less pronounced in countries where the government continues to play a significant role under managed liberalization in the electricity sector. 
